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Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds
RACKETEERING, RICO AND TIE REVENUE RULE IN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA V. R.J. REYNOLDS:
CIVIL RICO CLAIMS FOR FOREIGN TAX LAW
VIOLATIONS
Elizabeth J. Farnam
Abstract. When Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), it created a civil cause of action for any entity, including a foreign government, to
recover for injury caused by a defendant's pattern of racketeering activity. However,
Congress did not expressly indicate how the revenue rule, a conflict of laws doctrine that
allows a court to decline to enforce a foreign government's tax claim or judgment, would
relate to civil RICO claims. In Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Holdings, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
revenue rule barred Canada's civil RICO suit for lost tax revenues caused by R.J. Reynolds'
extensive tobacco smuggling scheme. This Note argues that the revenue rule should not block
Canada's civil RICO suit. The rationale for the revenue rule, the constitutional separation of
powers principle, would not be implicated if the court were to hear the case. In addition, the
majority opinion impermissibly expanded the revenue rule to restrict the scope of RICO
because the rule had previously only applied to claims based on foreign tax laws.
Between 1991 and 1997, R.J. Reynolds allegedly participated in an
elaborate scheme to smuggle tobacco in contravention of Canadian tax
laws.' In response, Canada brought a suit under the Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)2 to recover, inter alia, lost tax
revenues and increased law enforcement expenses. A federal district
court in the Northern District of New York dismissed Canada's suit for
failure to state a claim The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed.4 Specifically, the Second Circuit held that the
revenue rule, which states that U.S. courts are not required to enforce
foreign tax judgments,5 bars the claim because the RICO damages would
be calculated based on lost revenues.6 Yet, had the plaintiff been New
I. See Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. [hereinafter Reynolds I],
103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137-38 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), affd [hereinafter Reynolds I], 268 F.3d 103, 106-
07 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 2d 415,419 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (criminal case).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
3. Reynolds 1, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
4. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 106.
5. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14 (1964); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrED STATES, § 483 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATMMENT].
6. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 106.
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York State instead of Canada, the suit would have proceeded.7 After
Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds [hereinafter Reynolds I],'
the Second Circuit denied Canada's petition for rehearing, and Canada
filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.9
The illicit tobacco trade emanating from the U.S. has become a global
problem. 0 In recent years, American tobacco companies have apparently
smuggled cigarettes into Canada, the European Union, Ecuador,
Honduras, Belize, and Colombia.1" Following the Reynolds I decision,
other civil RICO cases have been pursued, most recently in Florida.1
2
Thus, the issues presented in Reynolds II will likely be reconsidered in
another circuit, if not in the U.S. Supreme Court. However, although
RICO allows foreign states to assert claims to remedy racketeering
injuries,13 the Reynolds II decision now effectively nullifies their cause of
action if they seek to recover lost tax revenue in the Second Circuit.1
4
This Note argues that the Reynolds 11 court should have allowed
Canada's civil RICO suit to proceed. Part I explains the scope and
purpose of RICO. Part II describes the revenue rule's origins, the debate
surrounding the rule's validity, and the present state of the rule in U.S.
law. Part III details the facts, history, and rationale of Reynolds 11.15
Finally, Part IV argues that Reynolds II was wrongly decided for two
reasons. First, the Second Circuit incorrectly found that the case
presented a separation of powers problem, leading the court to
inappropriately apply the revenue rule to block Canada's claim. Second,
7. See Missouri v. W.E.R., 55 F.3d 350, 357 (8th Cir. 1995) (State has a cause of action under
civil RICO); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1355 (2d Cir. 1988); 111. Dep't of Revenue v.
Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the government stated a claim for civil
RICO for repeated mailing of false tax returns, a mail fraud violation).
8. 268 F.3d 103.
9. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, petition for cert. filed, 35
U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. March 19, 2002) (No. 01-1317); see also Cristin Schmitz, U.S. Supreme Court
Asked to Review Tobacco-Suit Dismissal, THE LAWYERS WEEKLY, March 22, 2002 at 19.
10. See generally Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 103; Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002); European Community v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
11. See generally Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d 103; Philip Morris, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; Japan
Tobacco, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 231; European Cmrty., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 460.
12. See Philip Morris, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
13. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988).
14. See Japan Tobacco, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 234.
15. Reynolds 1l, 268 F.3d at 106.
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the Reynolds II court employed a novel expansion of the revenue rule
that impermissibly restricted the scope of RICO.
I. IN RICO, CONGRESS CREATED BROAD REMEDIES TO
FIGHT RACKETEERING
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO, 6 a remedial statute that provides
both criminal penalties and civil remedies against defendants who
participate in a pattern of racketeering activity. 17 The statute was a
response to a two-decade investigation that revealed the enormous
influence of organized crime on businesses, state and local governments,
and labor unions." This widespread impact 9 lead Congress "to seek the
eradication of organized crime in the United States... by establishing
new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime."20
Culpability under RICO arises out of a preliminary three-step
analysis: the defendant must have committed racketeering activity, the
defendant's activity must amount to a pattern, and the defendant must
thereby influence an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce.2' RICO
defines racketeering activity by reference to specific state22 and federal
criminal laws prohibiting extortion, embezzlement, mail fraud, wire
fraud, obstruction of justice, securities fraud, money laundering, obscene
materials, terrorism, and drug activity.23 To commit a pattern of
racketeering, a defendant must have committed a minimum of two of the
16. 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
17. Id.
18. See THE ABA REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 10 (1952-1953);
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200-09 (1967); see also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO
Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249
(1982).
19. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970); 18
U.S.C. § 1961 (detailing RICO's history). The Statement of Findings and Purpose notes that
"organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity
that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption." Id.
20. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969).
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,496 (1985).
22. State laws must be punishable by more than one year imprisonment. 18 U.S.C § 1961.
23. Id.
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listed crimes within a ten-year period.' In addition, the acts must have
"continuity plus relationship"--the acts must have been related to each
other and continue or threaten to continue.' Finally, the racketeering
activity must have influenced an enterprise that is involved in interstate
commerce.26 For example, a defendant might invest proceeds of
racketeering activity into a lawful business or undertake a smuggling
scheme through a corporation.27
RICO allows foreign governments to recover losses resulting from
racketeering activity.2 RICO specifically permits a civil cause of action
for any person whose business or property is injured due to a RICO
violation.29 RICO defines a person as "any... entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property." '3 Therefore, a foreign
government is considered a person for the purposes of the RICO
statute,3 allowing foreign governments to file RICO claims.32
RICO provides substantial civil remedies for damages suffered due to
RICO violations.33 Eligible plaintiffs may sue for treble damages34 and
reasonable attorney's fees.35  Compensable injuries may include
intangible losses, such as the value of confidential business
information. 6 The Second Circuit has recognized that lost tax revenue is
a cognizable RICO injury.37
24. Id. § 1961(5). In some cases, more than two acts may be required. See, e.g,. HJ. Inc. v. N.W.
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1988).
25. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239.
26. 18 U.S.C § 1962(b).
27. Id. § 1962(a)-(d).
28. Id. § 1962(a)-(c).
29. Id. § 1964(c).
30. Id. § 1961(3).
31. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988); Cf Ill. Dep't of
Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 316 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that state governmental units can sue
under RICO).
32. Cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-20 (1978) (applying the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1994), a statutory predecessor of RICO).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
34. 'Treble damages" consist of three times the damages the plaintiff actually suffered. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 397 (7th ed. 1999).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
36. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,26-27 (1987) (relating to mail and wire fraud).
37. See United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1355 (2d Cir. 1988).
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The purpose of RICO is both to compensate victims and to turn them
into "private attorneys general"38 who act to "fill prosecutorial gaps." '39
Congress seeks not merely to punish offenders for racketeering, but also
to attack organized crime at its economic roots,' divesting the RICO
enterprise of its illegal earnings.1 By establishing both civil and criminal
sanctions and incorporating a considerable array of state and federal
crimes, Congress ensured that RICO would be a broad remedial statute.42
Congress expressly noted that RICO must be "liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes."43 The United States Supreme Court has
complied with this mandate by allowing RICO claims in many situations
that Congress did not expressly mention.' For example, in United States
v. Turkette,45 the Court refused to limit the broad language of RICO by
holding that both legitimate and illegitimate businesses could be
prosecuted under civil RICO. 46 The Court has also allowed a RICO claim
against an association of pro-life demonstrators, despite a lack of
economic motive.47 In fact, plaintiffs have successfully used the statute
against an assortment of defendants, including manufacturers of farmers'
silos, 48 a commercial bank that improperly calculated interest,49 violators
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,"0 and health insurers."
38. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000).
39. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,493 (1985).
40. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,585 (1981).
41. Id.
42. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481.
43. Pub. L No. 91-452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970). Liberal construction will tend to favor
the plaintiff, while strict construction will tend to favor the defendant. See generally Craig W. Palm,
Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980).
44. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inirex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479
(1985); See also Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 160 (2001) (holding an
employee can be a person distinct from corporation); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61-66
(1997) (holding conspiracy defendant himself need not have committed racketeering acts); Nat'l
Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256-62 (1994) (holding economic motive not required).
45. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
46. Id. at 587.
47. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 261.
48. See generally Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) (product defect action against
manufacturers of farmers' silos).
49. See generally Haroco, Inc. v. Amn. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399 (7th Cir.
1984) ("Congress appears to have preferred a broad statute, even if overinclusion might result.").
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). See generally Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815
F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ERISA violations).
51. See generally Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999) (claim against health insurers).
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The Ninth Circuit has even allowed the Philippines to proceed with a
civil RICO claim against its former president, Ferdinand Marcos, and his
wife. The Philippines alleged that the Marcoses misappropriated
government money, committed mail and wire fraud, and transported
stolen property into the United States in a pattern of racketeering
activity.53 The court held that the Philippines government had standing to
bring a RICO claim.
4
The U.S. Supreme Court has also been willing to admonish lower
federal courts for attempting to narrow RICO's broad language through
judicial "statutory amendment., 55 For example, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co.,56 a Belgian corporation filed a civil RICO claim against an
American corporation based on mail and wire fraud.57 The Second
Circuit created an additional standing requirement that a civil RICO
plaintiff must demonstrate racketeering injury above and beyond the
injury caused by the underlying unlawful acts.5 Furthermore, the Second
Circuit held that a civil RICO defendant must have been previously
convicted of the underlying crimes.59 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the additional requirements limited civil claims in a manner
inconsistent with the history, language, and policy of RICO." Thus, the
Court refused to allow lower courts to invent restrictions on civil RICO
claims that would limit the statute's scope.
II. THE REVENUE RULE PERMITS COURTS TO DISMISS
FOREIGN TAX CLAIMS
The revenue rule is an American conflict of laws principle61 that
permits a court to decline to enforce foreign tax judgments or hear
52. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1375 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 1357-58.
54. Id.
55. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,500 (1985).
56. Id. at 479.
57. Id. at 483-84.
58. Id. at 481.
59. Id. at 493.
60. Id.
61. EUGENE F. SCOLES, sr AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1189 (3d ed. 2000). American
application of the rule does not depend on the existence of a similar rule in a foreign jurisdiction:
"[A] court normally does not make its own rule dependent upon what the doctrine of a foreign state
on a point may be nor varies its own rule according to the foreign conflict-of-laws rule." Id.
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foreign tax claims,62 despite the general rule that foreign judgments are
usually recognized in U.S. courts.63 The rule arose over two hundred
years ago in England, when Lord Mansfield announced in Holman v.
Johnson"4 that "no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of
another."65 In American case law, the rule evolved into a domestic
revenue rule, which was applied and then almost completely abolished
between sister states of the United States, and an international revenue
rule.6 Federal courts have seldom applied the rule, so scarce case law
exists clarifying its scope. Recently, the rule has been applied to causes
of action arising under U.S. statutes.67
A. The Revenue Rule in the United States
The English revenue rule gave rise to two distinct lines of American
cases. 68 The domestic revenue rule consists of sister states' refusal to
enforce each other's tax claims or judgments. 9 The international revenue
rule involves the enforcement of foreign states' tax claims and
judgments.70
62. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5 and accompanying text
63. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 201-202 (1895) (recognizing international comity
doctrine).
64. 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1 Cowp. 341 (K.B. 1775).
65. See id. at 1121; Boucher v. Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734) (Lord Hardwicke, C.J.). In
these cases, 18th Century British courts chose to uphold contracts that violated foreign law in order
to protect the British smuggling trade. See also State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193
S.W.2d 919, 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax
Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 265, 272-77
(2000).
66. See generally Rodgers, 193 S.V.2d 919, 922-26; Kovatch, supra note 65.
67. See generally United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (lst Cir. 1996); United States v. Trapilo,
130 F.3d 547, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1997); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456,
472 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Reynolds II, 268 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2001). Cf. United States v. Pierce, 224
F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000).
68. See generally Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935); Her Majesty
the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 433 F. Supp. 410,411 (1977),
affd, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. See Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 271.
70. Gilbertson, 433 F. Supp. at 411. A third related rule states that one nation will not enforce the
penal laws of another. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 665 (1892). One early justification
for the revenue rule was that tax laws were akin to penal laws, and therefore unenforceable. See, e.g.,
Oklahoma v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 290, 299 (1911). The U.S. Supreme Court
disaggregated penal laws from revenue laws by holding that taxes are not considered penal.
Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 271.
849
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The first federal court case to apply the domestic revenue rule was
Moore v. Mitchell." In Moore, Judge Learned Hand stated that it might
be embarrassing for the courts of one state to examine the tax laws of a
foreign state, because tax laws, like penal laws, are "provisions for the
public order" of another state, and traditionally tax laws were viewed as
a reflection of society's morals. 72 He reasoned that the state courts should
not entertain suits under sister state tax laws because courts are not in a
position to scrutinize other states' public policy, and should not interfere
with interstate or foreign relations.73 Although Moore dealt with the
domestic revenue rule, courts have recognized that the reasoning also
applies internationally.74
B. International Revenue Rule
The U.S. Supreme Court has taken only a passing notice of the
international revenue rule. The case law and scholarly interpretations of
the revenue rule display a pattern of decline through the middle of the
20th century, with a resurgence after 1979.7' After this revival, the rule
was extended to apply to causes of action based on U.S. statutes, with
varying results.76
1. Federal Court Interpretations
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,77 Justice White noted in a
dissenting opinion that "courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue
71. 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), affid on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
72. Id. at 604. (Hand, J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. See Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 271-73. The U.S. Supreme Court eliminated the domestic
revenue rule's application to sister state tax judgments based on the Constitutional Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Id. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Soon thereafter, numerous state courts and legislatures
determined that sister state tax claims would also be entertained, even without constitutional
mandate. See Buckley v. Huston, 291 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1972) (collecting cases); State ex rel.
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946). Many other states opted
to enact statutes providing for reciprocal enforcement of tax claims. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 12-35c (2000); IDAHO CODE § 63-1403 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.141 (2000).
75. See infra notes 77-102 and accompanying text.
76. See generally Reynolds II, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001); Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris,
188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002); European Community v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp.
2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
77. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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and penal laws of a foreign state, because no country has an obligation to
further the governmental interests of a foreign sovereign."'78 However,
the U.S. Supreme Court has never applied the revenue rule.
In 1979, almost a decade after Congress enacted RICO, the Ninth
Circuit became the first American court to directly apply the
international revenue rule in Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the
Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson.79 In that case, British
Columbia sought to enforce a Canadian income tax judgment obtained
against the defendants, citizens of Oregon, for logging work performed
in Canada.80 The Gilbertson court applied the revenue rule to bar British
Columbia's claim. The court characterized the international revenue rule
as "well recognized"--in fact, so well recognized that it had never been
challenged in a U.S. court.8" Still, the Gilbertson court acknowledged
that the rule may have only been dicta in the 18th century English cases
that originally announced it.82 Consequently the Ninth Circuit turned to
the reasoning of Moore,83 even though the Moore court had analyzed the
domestic revenue rule.84 The Gilbertson court held that the revenue rule
was appropriate because to scrutinize foreign tax judgments might
interfere with international relations by embarrassing a foreign
government. 85
The 1979 Gilbertson case marked a turning point for the revenue rule.
Before Gilbertson, the U.S. Supreme Court had disavowed the rule in
respect to sister state tax judgments,86 state courts and legislatures had
largely rejected the revenue rule with respect to sister state tax claims,87
and federal courts had never applied the international revenue rule.88
78. Id. at 448 (White, J., dissenting on other grounds).
79. 433 F. Supp. 410 (D. Or. 1977), aff'd, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
80. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1162. The judgment was actually a certificate of tax assessment
against the defendants. In Canada, the certificate had the same effect as a judgment. Id.
81. Id. at 1164. The district court in Gilbertson coined the term revenue rule. Reynolds 1, 103 F.
Supp. 2d 134, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
82. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1164.
83. Id. at 1164, (quoting Moore, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929)). See supra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
84. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1164.
85. Id.
86. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935).
87. See Buckley v. Huston, 291 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1972).
88. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1164.
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However, in 1979, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Gilbertson revived the
revenue rule.89
2. Scholarly Criticisms of the Revenue Rule
The revenue rule has been the subject of scholarly criticism for more
than 150 years,9" but the rule was increasingly criticized in the middle of
the 20th century.9' The abolition of the domestic revenue rule for sister
state judgments enhanced the skepticism of the revenue rule.92 In
addition, many states began to enforce the tax claims of sister states,
based on a belief that the revenue rule was outdated and not justified.93
Some commentators argued that tax laws should be enforced, but only
tax penalties, such as fines, should be denied enforcement under the
penal rule.94 Just two years before Gilbertson was decided, Robert A.
Leflar, a leading theorist on American conflicts law, wrote that the
domestic revenue rule was "senseless[]", and that "the old [revenue] rule
will eventually be changed by all the states, either through legislation or
by judicial reexamination."95
Scholarly legal opinion seems to have remained generally adverse to
the revenue rule until at least a decade after the enactment of RICO,
when the Ninth Circuit revived the doctrine in Gilbertson.96 The criticism
89. Id. at 1166.
90. See Reynolds II, 268 F.3d 103, 124 (2d Cir. 2001). ("In academic literature, there is a long
history of criticism of the revenue rule as creating improper incentives for moral and commercial
conduct.") (collecting cases and secondary sources). See, e.g., JAMES KENT, 3 COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW 335-36 (8th ed. 1854) (stating that rule is "unsound and immoral"); The
Anne, 1 F. Cas. 955, 956, 1 Mason 508, No. 412 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818).
91. See, e.g., Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 268; Banco Frances e Brasileiro S. A. v. Doe, 331
N.E.2d 502, 505-06 (N.Y. 1975); State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 282 S.W.2d 150, 151
(Ark. 1955); but see City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 184 N.E.2d 167, 169 (N.Y. 1962). See generally
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and
Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601 (1968); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International
Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1607-08 (1966); Albert
A. Ehrenzweig, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 49, at 174 (1962); Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement
of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1932).
92. Much of the academic criticism of the domestic rule also applies to the international rule
because the underlying principles are the same. See supra note 74.
93. See State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946);
HERBERT F. GOODRICH & EUGENE F. SCOLEs, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 99-100 (4th
ed. 1964).
94. EDWARD S. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 441-42 (1963).
95. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 49 (3d ed. 1977).
96. 433 F. Supp. 410 (1977), afTd, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
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subsided following Gilbertson, but many scholars still advocated the
abolition of the revenue rule. For example, in 1970, one commentator
wrote: "Most cases usually relied upon as authorities [for the penal and
revenue rules] are more than half a century old and the lawyer's prospect
of avoiding the application of foreign law on this ground is minimal." 98
Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, notes that "the rationale for not recognizing or enforcing
tax judgments is largely obsolete."9 9 Recently, a few courts have also
had reservations about the validity of the revenue rule. 00
Since the Gilbertson court's revival of the revenue rule, courts have
been faced with questions of whether to apply the revenue rule when the
foreign state's claim is based on a federal statute.' It is against this
sparse common law backdrop that modern courts must define the
revenue rule's relationship to American statutes.
C. Modern Applications of the Revenue Rule to Statutory Claims
In recent years, several courts have addressed the revenue rule in cases
where a U.S. statute rather than a foreign revenue law created the cause
of action. 02 In United States v. Boots,0 3 the First Circuit held that the
rule barred criminal prosecution under the federal wire fraud statute,0
4
where the defendant attempted to defraud a foreign government of
97. See, e.g., Barbara A. Silver, Modernizing the Revenue Rule: The Enforcement of Foreign Tax
Judgments, 22 GA. J. INT'L & CowP. L. 609, 613 (1992); Richard E. Smith, Note, The
Nonrecognition of Foreign Tax Judgments: International Tax Evasion, 1981 U. ILL- L. REV. 241,
263-67 (1981).
98. ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 78 (2d ed. 1970)-
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, Reporter's Note 2.
100. See, e.g., Reynolds I, 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140, n.3 (N-D.N.Y. 2000) ("Were the Court
writing on a clean slate.., it would be inclined to find the Revenue Rule to be outdated (to the
extent it was ever properly recognized by courts in the United States in the first instance) and the
rationales for the rule to be largely unpersuasive, at least with respect to the recognition of foreign
tax judgments."); see also United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 550 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997)-
101. See generally United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996); Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 547;
European Community- v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Reynolds
II, 268 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2001). Cf- United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. See generally Boots, 80 F.3d at 580-87; Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549; European Community, 150
F. Supp. 2d at 472; Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 106. Cf. United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.
2000).
103. 80 F.3d 580.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
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taxes.10 5 The Boots defendants had allegedly conspired to smuggle
tobacco into Canada.10 6 The First Circuit reasoned that prosecution would
"functionally" enforce a foreign tax law because the "sole object" of the
defendants' scheme was to deprive Canada of revenues."°1 Furthermore,
proof of fraud would require the trial court to evaluate Canada's tax laws
and rule on defendants' challenges to their validity." 8 Such a ruling
could implicate U.S. foreign policy." 9 Although the Boots case would
probably not interfere with foreign policy and did not call for direct
enforcement of a foreign tax judgment, the court refused to apply the
revenue rule on a case-by-case basis."0 The Boots court instead held that
even the possibility of interfering with foreign relations mandated
dismissal."' Thus, in the First Circuit, the revenue rule mandates
dismissal whenever evaluation of a foreign revenue law is necessary.
In United States v. Trapilo"2 and the related case United States v.
Pierce, 13 the Second Circuit expressly rejected the reasoning of Boots."4
In Trapilo, the defendants had allegedly smuggled liquor across a Native
American reservation to avoid paying Canadian taxes." 5 The Trapilo
court found that the scheme to defraud Canada of tax revenues was
cognizable under the wire fraud statute."6 According to the statute, the
prosecution needed only to show that the defendants "devised or
intend[ed] to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud."" 7 Thus, a wire
fraud conviction could result regardless of the scheme's actual success." 8
Consequently, the Second Circuit had no occasion to pass on the validity
105. Boots, 80 F.3d at 586-87.
106. Id. at 583.
107. Id. at 587.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 588.
111. Id.
112. 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997).
113. 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000).
114. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549, Pierce, 224 F.3d at 167.
115. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994); see also Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551.
117. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549.
118. Id. at 552.
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of Canadian laws, as long as the prosecutors could show that the
defendants intended to use the wires to defraud Canada of taxes. 19
The Trapilo court held that the revenue rule did not mandate dismissal
every time a foreign revenue law was implicated." ° Instead, the revenue
rule should be applied only in cases that would interfere with the
separation of powers.' For example, the claim might be barred if the
court would otherwise have to decide a foreign relations question more
properly reserved to the political branches." However, the separation of
powers principle was not disturbed in Trapilo because the court was
implementing Congress' purpose by applying the federal wire fraud
statute.123
Similarly, in Pierce, the Second Circuit held that evidence of a foreign
revenue law was necessary for a conviction under the wire fraud statute
where the victim was a foreign government and the injury was lost tax
revenues. 24 A necessary element of the wire fraud statute was a scheme
to defraud, which depends on the existence of a property interest."z To
show the Canadian property interest in taxes, the government needed to
prove that Canada actually imposed taxes on alcohol transported across
the border.' 26 The government failed to introduce any evidence of the
Canadian taxes127 and the conviction could not be upheld. 12 In sum, the
Trapilo court held that the revenue rule does not bar prosecution of a
scheme to defraud the Canadian government of tax revenues, and the
119. Id. "At the heart of this indictment is the misuse of the wires in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue, not the validity of a foreign sovereign's revenue
laws." Id.
120. Id. at 553.
121. Id. The separation of powers principle is a political framework in which the government is
divided into three branches, each of which exercises a distinct type of authority. The separation of
powers is not absolute. A system of checks and balances creates some overlap--for example, the
executive veto-that restrains the power of each branch. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
707 (1974); The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison).
122. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 553. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936) (holding that the executive branch exercises primary control over foreign affairs.)
123. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 553.
124. United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 2000). Following Trapilo, all of the
defendants except Regina and Lyle Pierce entered into plea arrangements. Subsequently, the Pierces
were convicted and sentenced. Pierce is the appeal of that conviction. Id. at 164.
125. Id. at 165.
126. Id. at 166.
127. Id. at 167.
128. Id. at 164.
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revenue rule only operates where there are significant separation of
powers concerns.'29 The Pierce court added that in order to sustain a
conviction, the government must introduce evidence of each element of
the wire fraud statute, including evidence that Canada imposed taxes and
as a result held a property interest.1
30
Although the Second Circuit in Pierce did not discuss the revenue
rule, one can assume that if the prosecution had introduced evidence of
the Canadian taxes to prove that a property right existed, the defendants
would also have had the opportunity to introduce contrary evidence that
the tax laws were either invalid or nonexistent. In fact, because the
sentencing under the money laundering statute varies according to the
amount of money involved, the court would need to first establish that
the Canadian laws were valid and in force and then determine the degree
to which the defendants actually violated the foreign law.
13 1
Notwithstanding this possible evaluation of foreign tax laws, the Pierce
court allowed the case to proceed, choosing to wait and see if separation
of powers concerns arose instead of applying the revenue rule to dismiss
the case. 132 Although the question was not resolved in Pierce, it is
possible that the court's application of foreign revenue laws would have
violated neither the separation of powers nor the revenue rule. Overall,
Second Circuit precedent has established that it is within a court's
discretion to determine whether separation of powers problems may
arise, and to allow a case to proceed when interference with foreign
affairs is not imminent.
129. United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547,553 (2d Cir. 1997).
130. Pierce, 224 F.3d at 167.
131. See Reynolds II, 268 F.3d 103, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., dissenting); United States v.
Chmielewski, 218 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2000) ("It is no intrusion [into foreign jurisdictions and
jurisprudences] to gauge the severity of [the defendant's] domestic crime by measuring the damage
done to his extraterritorial victims. In doing so, we consider a foreign loss not to uphold a foreign
law, but to uphold our own law.., which directs us to consider the loss caused by fraud as a
measure of ajust punishment.").
132. The Trapilo court "assumed... that the government would prove at trial... that the
defendants conspired to 'participate in an illegal venture to smuggle liquor from the United States
into Canada where it would be sold on the 'black market' to avoid the payment of Canadian taxes
and duties."' Pierce, 224 F.3d at 167, (quoting Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552) (emphasis added by the
Pierce court). By extension, the Trapilo court probably would have assumed that the trial court
would have determined that the Canadian taxes were valid and that the defendants had violated
them.
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Finally, in European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,' a U.S.
district court in the Eastern District of New York held that the revenue
rule did not bar a suit by a foreign sovereign to recover civil RICO
damages for lost tax revenues. 34 The European Community brought a
civil RICO suit against various tobacco companies and related entities
for smuggling tobacco from the United States into Europe to evade
European taxes.1 35 The court thoroughly analyzed the origin of the
revenue rule and concluded that the rule had been called into serious
doubt. Furthermore, to the extent that the rule existed at all, its
application was discretionary. 136 The European Community court cited
Trapilo and Pierce for the proposition that the revenue rule should apply
only when the case would encroach upon the foreign relations powers of
the political branches.33 The revenue rule was not applicable to a suit
based on civil RICO, because the separation of powers was not
implicated. 38 RICO, an American law, provided the rule of decision in
the case and foreign law need only be applied in the calculation of
damages.1 39 In addition, the suit actually promoted the United States'
interest in enforcing RICO in eliminating racketeering activity.14 The
European Community court rejected the argument that the existence of
tax treaties with Canada precluded Canada's civil suit, noting that the
enforcement of a statute to combat racketeering activity did not conflict
with the U.S. tax treaties because the RICO claim is not simply an
alternative tax enforcement mechanism. 4' The district court also rejected
the argument that American courts might not have the ability to interpret
foreign revenue laws, noting that American courts frequently interpret
133. 150 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). The court eventually held that the European
Community (EC) was unable to demonstrate injury separate from that of the member states, and the
claim was dismissed. The EC failed to allege the injury needed to bring suit under RICO. Because
the EC's budget is a set amount, the loss of revenues to member states did not similarly affect the
revenues of the EC. Id. at 501-02.
134. Id. at 483-84.
135. Id. at 462-71 (detailing the complex facts of the smuggling scheme)..
136. Id. at 483. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 5; Silver, supra note 97 at 611-12.
137. European Cmy., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
138. Id. at 484.
139. Id. at 48344.
140. Id.
141. Id. ("[A]djudication of this case in no way involves the judiciary in second-guessing the
adequacy, legitimacy, or propriety of any action taken or judgment made by Congress or the
Executive Branch with respect to the ability of foreign sovereigns to enforce their tax laws.").
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and apply other types of foreign laws. 42 Therefore, even though courts
have struggled with the application of the revenue rule to federal
statutory claims, until Reynolds II, courts in the Second Circuit chose not
to apply the revenue rule to block cases based on U.S. federal statutes,
primarily because there were no separation of powers problems
presented.43
IV. A7TORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA V. R.J. REYNOLDS
A. Facts and Procedural History
The case of Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds [hereinafter
Reynolds 1] emerged from an alleged scheme, facilitated by R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (R.J. Reynolds) and other
defendants,1" to smuggle tobacco into Canada to avoid increased
Canadian tobacco taxes. 145 In 1991, the Canadian government doubled its
cigarette taxes, increasing the average price per carton from $26 to
$48.46 Soon thereafter, R.J. Reynolds and the other defendants allegedly
developed a smuggling operation to avoid paying the increased taxes. 14 7
The defendants purportedly exported cigarettes out of Canada, falsely
declaring that they were not for consumption in Canada, and sold them to
known smugglers who then covertly transported the cigarettes back into
Canada for sale on the black market. 41 Over time, the scheme evolved. 49
142. Id. at484, n.16.
143. See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547,552 (2d Cir. 1997); European Community, 150 F.
Supp. 2d at 483-84.
144. American companies R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (Holdings), Northern Brands
International, Inc. (NBI), R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR US), R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
International, Inc. (International), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Puerto Rico (RJR PR), and
RJR-MacDonald (RJR MacDonald), a Canadian company, and Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers
Council (CTMC), [hereinafter defendants].
145. See Reynolds II, 268 F.3d 103, 105-10 (2d Cir. 2001).
146. Id. at 106.
147. Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 5-9, Reynolds I,
103 F. Supp. 2d 134 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 99-CV-2194) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint]. The
scheme was developed first by RJR MacDonald, and later expanded to involve other defendants.
RJR Macdonald is a subsidiary of RJR Nabisco, now called RJR Holdings, as is RJR International.
The subsidiaries of RJR Holdings are alleged to have participated in the smuggling scheme
individually and through their agents, alter egos, subsidiaries, division or parent companies. The
Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council is named as an agent of RJR Macdonald. Id.
148. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 106.
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The defendants began to export Canadian cigarettes from Canada
through the Foreign Trade Zones in New York, where they were shipped
to a Native American reservation and then smuggled back into Canada.15
Perhaps in response, Canada imposed a $6 per carton excise tax on
cigarettes." Around that time, the defendants began to produce
cigarettes in Puerto Rico that were made to resemble Canadian RJR-
MacDonald cigarettes. 52 These cigarettes were then smuggled into
Canada.'53 The defendants then created Northern Brands International
(NBI), allegedly to insulate RJR MacDonald from selling directly to
smugglers and to conceal the smuggling scheme.154 The defendants made
several hundred million dollars in profit from the increased Canadian
sales. 55 In 1994, Canada lowered its cigarette taxes, but the defendants
allegedly continued the smuggling until 1998.156 In 1997 and 1998, NBI
and 21 individuals were indicted in connection with the smuggling
operation. 5
7
The Attorney General of Canada (Canada) filed a civil RICO'58
complaint in a federal distrct court in the Northern District of New
York. 59 Canada's complaint alleged that the defendants violated and
conspired to violate RICO by using a corporation to conduct a pattern of
racketeering activity including continuous instances of mail and wire
fraud.'" Canada alleged that the defendants' RICO violations were the
proximate cause of injury to its property in the form of lost tax revenues,
increased law enforcement costs, and revenue lost when Canada repealed
tax laws, allegedly in reaction to the defendants' conduct.161 Canada





151. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 14-15.
152. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 107.
153. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 32-33.
154. See id. at 27-29.
155. Reynolds i, 268 F.3d at 107.
156. Plaintiffs Complaint at 36-39.
157. See United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 2d 415,419 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
159. Reynolds I, 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
160. Reynolds If, 268 F.3d at 107-08.
161. Id. at 108.
162. Id. at 107-08 (detailing Canada's alternative claims).
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The defendants moved to dismiss,' 63 arguing that the suit was no more
than an attempt to enforce Canadian revenue laws."M The district court
dismissed the case, holding that Canada's claim for damages based on
taxes was indeed barred by the revenue rule.165 In particular, the district
court held that Canada could not meet RICO's injury requirement,
because to do so would require an evaluation of Canadian revenue
laws. 66 Canada appealed.' 67
B. The Second Circuit's Majority Opinion
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision in Reynolds II,
holding that Canada's RICO claim was essentially one for lost taxes,
barred by the revenue rule. 68 The court reasoned that RICO did not
abrogate the common law revenue rule. 69 Instead, the court noted, the
revenue rule was well established and applicable to any direct or indirect
enforcement of tax laws. 7 In addition, the majority reviewed the
U.S./Canada tax treaty framework and found that the policy of the
executive branch was to limit foreign tax collection assistance.'
7
'
Therefore, to offer tax collection assistance to Canada might violate the
separation of powers principle by interfering with the executive's foreign
policy authority.'72 Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the
suit.7"
163. Id. at 108 (explaining that the defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)). See also Reynolds 1, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (listing alternative bases for dismissal).
164. Reynolds 1, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
165. Reynolds 1, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 143. The district court also held that RICO does not provide
the equitable relief Canada requested and that claims for increased law enforcement costs are not
allowed. Canada appealed all three holdings but the Second Circuit disposed of the case based on the
revenue rule. Reynolds 1l, 268 F.3d at 109.
166. Reynolds 1, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 143-44.
167. Id.
168. Reynolds 1l, 268 F.3d at 130-31.
169. Id. at 106.
170. Id. at 130-31, 134.
171. Id. at 124.
172. Id. at 114.
173. Id. at 109.
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1. Direct and Indirect Enforcement of Revenue Laws
The majority held that the revenue rule mandated dismissal because
this case involved an action by Canada to enforce its tax laws "directly
and indirectly," notwithstanding the claim's origin under RICO.174
According to the Reynolds II court, it is the substance of the action, not
the form, that counts. 175 The majority, relying on foreign case law, 176 held
that the fact that the claim was based on a U.S. statute was immaterial
because the claim's ultimate effect would be to reimburse Canada for
lost taxes.Y In the Canadian case United States v. Harden,78 the United
States government sought to enforce a tax settlement agreement in
Canada. 179 The Canadian Supreme Court held that the "whole object" of
that case was the collection of U.S. taxes, making its remedy a direct
enforcement of tax laws.'80 The Reynolds II court also cited an Irish High
Court case for the proposition that even indirect enforcement of a foreign
revenue law mandates dismissal of the case.'8 ' The Reynolds II court
elevated the substance of the remedy being sought over the form of the
action and found that the RICO claim for treble damages would amount
to a direct enforcement of Canadian tax laws.'82
2. Statutory Abrogation of the Revenue Rule
The Reynolds 1I majority held that RICO did not abrogate the revenue
rule because the rule was "well established" when RICO was enacted
and Congress did not express an intent to abolish the common law
rule.'83 The Second Circuit cited principles of statutory construction
requiring a court to construe a statute to preserve the common law,
174. Id. at 130-31.
175. Id. at 130.
176. United States v. Harden [1963] S.C.R. 366, 371 (Can.).
177. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d 103 at 130-31 (quoting Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. MeVey, [1954] I.R.89,
102-03 (Ire.)).
178. [1963] S.C.R. at 371.
179. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. at 371.
180. Id. at 372-73.
181. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 130 (citing Peter Buchanan Ltd., [1954] I.R. at 102).
182. Reynolds 1i, 268 F.3d at 131 (dismissing Canada's claims for increased law enforcement
costs as an indirect enforcement of the revenue laws of Canada).
183. Id. at 126.
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absent clear evidence of congressional intent to the contrary."s Because
the court found that the revenue rule was in existence long before
Congress enacted RICO,"85 and Congress did not explicitly mention the
revenue rule in RICO's legislative history, 8 6 the Second Circuit held the
statute did not abrogate the common law rule.8 7
In support of its conclusion that the revenue rule was well established
in 1970, the Second Circuit cited several United States cases'88 and
asserted that while neither the United States Supreme Court nor the
Second Circuit had yet defined the scope of the rule, each had
acknowledged its existence."8 9 The Reynolds II court also cited a few
foreign revenue rule cases. 9 ' The Second Circuit conceded that the rule
had been severely criticized, but asserted that the legislature, not the
courts, should change the common law revenue rule. 9 '
3. The Role of Separation of Powers
The Reynolds II majority explained that the justifications for the
revenue rule include respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations'92 and
avoidance of extraterritorial application of foreign law.'93 Because
revenue laws often reflect a state's public policy, forum state judicial
scrutiny of those laws could potentially embarrass a foreign state.'94 In
addition, the court reasoned that the laws of one sovereign state should
not have effect within the borders of another, and no nation has the
obligation to further the sovereign interests of another.'95 The court
conceded that "concerns about sovereignty and extraterritorially
are... not absolute, and are not implicated in every case involving
foreign tax laws.' ' 6 However, the Canadian revenue laws at issue were
184. Id. at 129.
185. Id. at 126.
186. ld. at 129.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 111-12.
189. Id. at 108.
190. Id. at 111 n.5.
191. Id. at 124-25.
192. Id. at 111-12.
193. Id. at 114.
194. Id. at 112.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 113.
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the product of a social policy to combat smoking."9 Therefore, the claim
implicated the rationale underlying the revenue rule because the
Canadian revenue laws were the product of Canada's sovereignty.'98
The Reynolds II majority also reasoned that the Canadian claim could
potentially impact U.S. foreign policy.'99  The Second Circuit
distinguished the case at issue from a criminal prosecution, in which the
executive branch of the United States government would ultimately
oversee prosecutorial discretion."°° Executive oversight is absent in a
civil case."' The majority agreed with the First Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Boots,20 2 which held that cases involving the application
of foreign tax laws encroach on foreign relations and courts should
refrain from hearing them.' 3 The Reynolds II court thus adopted Boots in
the civil setting, while noting that Second Circuit precedent had rejected
Boots in the criminal law setting.' The Reynolds II court concluded that
the case was properly dismissed because it could conflict with U.S.
foreign policy.'
The Reynolds II court relied heavily on U.S. tax treaties.20 6 The lack of
general enforcement provisions in the treaties provided evidence that the
political branches intended to "to define and limit" foreign tax
enforcement assistance. 07 The court reasoned that the treaties implied an
intent to keep the revenue rule intact.2 8 The Second Circuit reasoned that
the executive should negotiate treaties to determine whether U.S. courts
should enforce foreign tax laws, but U.S. courts should not hear claims
for direct or indirect enforcement of foreign taxes. 09
In sum, the Reynolds II majority held that allowing a foreign
sovereign to directly or indirectly enforce its tax laws in U.S. courts
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 123.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 80 F.3d 580 (lst Cir. 1996).
203. Id. at 587-88; see also supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
204. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 123; see also supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
205. Reynolds 1l, 268 F.3d at 122.
206. Id. at 115-22.
207. Id. at 115.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 130.
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could potentially implicate U.S. foreign relations."' The court decided
that Canada's RICO claim was an impermissible attempt to enforce its
tax laws.21' The court affirmed the dismissal because tax laws are an
aspect of sovereignty and the U.S. treaty framework evinces an intent to
restrict enforcement of foreign tax laws.
212
C. The Reynolds II Dissent
Judge Calabresi dissented, reasoning that Canada's suit should be
allowed to proceed and the revenue rule should not bar the RICO
claim.213 The dissent argued that the claim did not involve the
enforcement of a Canadian tax judgment or claim.214 Instead, the dissent
characterized the suit as a United States cause of action created by
Congress to remedy injuries caused by racketeering activities.215
According to the dissent, the Canadian tax laws would be involved only
in the calculation of damages. 6
Judge Calabresi first summarized the majority's arguments for
applying the revenue rule. First, courts should not promote
extraterritorial effect of foreign laws. 7 Second, foreign policy
implications of the claim give rise to potential separation of powers
problems.218 Third, the judiciary has a limited ability to interpret foreign
laws. 219 The dissent then repudiated each of those justifications.'
According to the dissent, even though the claim might promote
Canadian interests, it primarily involved enforcement of RICO.221 While
the United States has no obligation to further Canada's sovereign
interests,222 Judge Calabresi asserted that the suit would promote
210. Id. at 123.
211. Id. at 130-131.
212. Id. at 115.




217. Id. at 136.
218. Id. at 136-37.
219. Id. at 137-38.
220. Id. at 136-39.
221. Id. at 136.
222. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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American interests by discouraging racketeering activity.' Given this
primary goal, for the dissent the incidental protection of Canadian
interests in pursuing that goal would be permissible.224
Judge Calabresi also argued that the separation of powers doctrine
would not be violated by this claim.2' According to the dissent, the
political branches created the RICO cause of action.2 6 For the dissent,
adjudicating Canada's RICO suit would amount to an implementation of
Congress' policy to eliminate organized crime. 7 Therefore, the dissent
reasoned, refusing to hear the case would actually hinder the
Congressional objective underlying RICO.'
Judge Calabresi recognized that the most relevant justification for the
revenue rule was that U.S. courts may not have the capacity to interpret
complex foreign tax laws because they may differ greatly from U.S.
law. 9 However, the dissent found this argument unpersuasive because
the Second Circuit had already rejected it in Pierce.230 The Pierce court
held that the prosecution must introduce evidence of foreign tax laws to
show that the defendants intended to defraud Canada of a property
interest.231 Further, a court must determine the extent to which those laws
were violated to apply the sentencing guidelines. 2 Thus, the dissent
reasoned, Pierce required a three-step determination: first, did the
defendant violate the wire fraud statute;2 3 second, to what extent did the
defendant cause injury by violating the Canadian laws; 4 and third, what
sentence should be imposed given that amount of injury.235 This inquiry
was acceptable to the Second Circuit in Pierce. 6 In Reynolds II, there
would be a parallel three step analysis: 7 first, did the defendant violate
223. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 136 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
224. Id.





230. 224 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2000).
231. Id. at 165. See also supra note 124-32 and accompanying text.







RICO; B second, to what extent did the defendant cause damage by
violating the Canadian laws;239 and third, what amount of civil damages
should be imposed given the amount of injury.240 Because the
interpretation of foreign law is involved only in the second step, and that
step would be identical in each case, Pierce should control and the case
should be allowed to proceed.241 Thus, the dissent rejected the argument
that the court would be incapable of interpreting foreign tax laws to
measure damages.242
Therefore, the relevance of the revenue rule to a civil RICO claim
presented a difficult question. The Reynolds I majority held that
Canada's claim would directly and indirectly enforce Canadian tax laws
and hearing the case would violate the separation of powers principle.243
In contrast, the dissent argued that the claim would further Congress'
goals under RICO and indeed would not interfere with U.S. foreign
policy.2"
V. REYNOLDS H WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
The revenue rule should not bar Canada's civil claim under RICO,
because according to Second Circuit precedent, 45 the revenue rule does
not apply unless separation of powers problems arise.246 Canada's civil
RICO suit is actually in accord with the policy of the political branches
of the United States. Congress has provided Canada with a cause of
action under RICO, and that is the foreign policy pronouncement that is
relevant to this suit. The fact that Canadian revenue laws will be used to
calculate damages does not automatically destroy Canada's claim,
because the revenue rule does not mandate abstaining from jurisdiction




241. Id. at 138-39.
242. Id. at 138.
243. Id. at 130-131.
244. Id. at 136 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
245. See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547,553 (2d Cir. 1997).
246. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
Vol. 77:843, 2002
Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds
Moreover, the liberal construction demanded by the statute means that
the common law revenue rule cannot be expanded to apply to a RICO
claim. A RICO cause of action is different from a tax claim, and the use
of the revenue rule to bar a federal statutory cause of action is a novel
expansion of the doctrine. The revenue rule in this sense cannot be
characterized as a long-established feature of the common law, and it
should not be allowed to restrict the federal RICO statute.
A. Canada's Suit Poses No Threat to U.S. Foreign Policy and Does
Not Implicate the Separation of Powers Doctrine
The primary justification for the revenue rule is that it allows courts to
avoid overstepping their limited authority in the area of foreign affairs,
thus maintaining the separation of powers.2 48 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that not every case or controversy that touches foreign
relations is beyond the judicial power.249 Only if the application of
foreign revenue laws infringes upon the separation of powers should the
court decline to exercise jurisdiction in the case."
The revenue rule should not be applied in every case involving foreign
revenue laws." The U.S. Supreme Court, in Milwaukee County v. M.E.
White Co.,2s 2 confirmed that the revenue rule does not address
jurisdiction, but the merits of the case. 3 The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law also states that a court can use discretion when
deciding whether to entertain a case involving foreign revenue laws. 4
According to Second Circuit precedent, the revenue rule should only
apply where the court finds separation of powers problems. 5 Under this
authority, it is necessary to examine the separation of powers
implications of allowing a foreign government to bring RICO claims in
order to decide whether the revenue rule should apply.
Enforcing Canada's civil RICO claim does not interfere with the
political branches' foreign policy goals. Because Canada's suit is
248. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
249. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
250. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 553.
251. id.
252. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
253. Id. at 272.
254. RESrAMEENT, supra note 5.
255. See Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 553; see supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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different from a tax claim, 2 6 much of the separation of powers analysis
that the Reynolds II court employed is not applicable in this case. The
Reynolds H court discussed U.S. tax treaties and concluded that those
treaties do not provide for assistance with collection of foreign taxes
except in limited circumstances. 57 Therefore, the majority concluded the
policy of the political branches is to refuse to assist with foreign tax
collection. 8 However, because Reynolds I involved a RICO suit, not a
tax claim, nothing in the treaty framework conflicts with a civil RICO
claim? 59 Instead, what is salient is that Congress enacted RICO to allow
plaintiffs, including foreign governments,60 to bring claims in response
to racketeering activity. It is not uncommon for Congress to adopt
divergent policies in various areas of law. While Congress chooses not to
provide for enforcement of every tax claim, it can at the same time create
a cause of action for foreign governments to collect damages for
racketeering activity. Such goals are not in conflict because the courts
can adjudicate RICO claims without opening the door to "general
enforcement" of foreign tax claims.
The policy behind RICO is the relevant foreign policy for the
purposes of determining whether a separation of powers problem exists
within a RICO claim. Congress intended foreign governments to have a
cause of action under RICO.261 Because RICO established Canada's
cause of action, the Reynolds II court would not be forced to formulate
foreign policy, adjudicating the claim would implement the policy
established by Congress.262 Furthermore, the Trapilo court held that the
fact that a foreign tax law must be examined does not necessarily force
the court to make an impermissible foreign relations choice.263
256. See infra Section V.B.1.
257. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
258. ld.
259. See infra notes 271-87 and accompanying text.
260. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Pfizer,
Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 311-19 (1978) (interpreting similar civil enforcement provision
in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1994)).
261. Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1358.
262. See Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 137 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (stating that the concern for
separation of powers is "misplaced whenever the legislative and executive branches have created the
cause of action. Under the circumstances, the courts cannot be said to be formulating foreign policy,
they are simply implementing the policy established by the other branches").
263. United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547,553 (2d Cir. 1997).
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The Reynolds II court's dismissal of Canada's civil RICO claim
actually frustrates Congress' chosen policy to eliminate organized crime.
Although U.S. federal courts are not obligated to further the interests of
other sovereigns,2 4 they are obligated to further America's interests as
defined by the political branches.265 Courts are normally bound to
entertain suits brought under federal statutes such as RICO.266 Congress
enacted RICO to encourage private parties, including foreign
governments, to help eliminate racketeering activity.267 RICO's private
enforcement provision serves domestic interests and Congress chose to
allow foreign governments to participate in serving those interests, even
if the result would further Canada's interests too.268 The chosen policies
behind RICO would be partially ineffectual if the claims of foreign
governments were not entertained. Furthermore, the revenue rule may
harm the very foreign relations that it is presumed to protect. It seems
likely that Canada would be more offended by the dismissal of its
apparently viable RICO claim than it would be by an evaluation of its
revenue laws after it had willingly submitted to the court's jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Reynolds II court erred by applying the revenue rule to bar
Canada's civil RICO claim because the suit does not interfere with the
separation of powers.
B. The Second Circuit Employed a Novel Use of the Revenue Rule
That Impermissibly Restricted RICO
A civil RICO suit's liability, remedy, and purpose differ greatly from
a tax collection suit. Therefore, the revenue rule should not apply equally
to both types of cases. The Reynolds 11 majority impermissibly expanded
the revenue rule to a U.S. statutory claim, and in doing so, defied Second
Circuit precedent and the goals of Congress.
264. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
265. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 136 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
266. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,409 (1990).
267. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,557 (2000).
268. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 136 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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1. A RICO Claim is Not a Tax Claim
The Second Circuit's holding in Reynolds II rested on the false
premise that Canada's RICO claim was nothing more than a tax claim.26 9
The Reynolds II court analyzed the case as if it were identical to a suit to
collect taxes." 0 The assertion that RICO claims are just indirect tax
claims, and the concomitant assumption that the revenue rule applies
equally to both, involves a sleight of hand that ignores the differences
between the two types of claims. The basis of liability for the RICO
claim, the amount of the damages available, and the very purpose of the
civil RICO suit are much broader than a basic tax collection suit.
First, both the basis for liability and the rule of decision for Canada's
claim is U.S. federal statutory law. 71 The gravamen of Canada's claim is
that the defendants' ongoing tobacco smuggling scheme violated RICO,
causing Canada economic injury.72 Congress created the RICO civil
cause of action and the rule of decision in this case also derives from the
federal statute. 73 In contrast, in Gilbertson,274 British Columbia tried to
directly enforce a tax judgment that was explicitly based on the
defendant's violation of Canadian tax laws.275 Therefore, Reynolds II and
Gilbertson cannot be compared because the Gilbertson claim did not
purport to be based in any American law.
Second, the amount of relief available in Canada's RICO suit greatly
exceeds Canada's lost tax revenues.2 76 In contrast, a claim for tax
collection might include payment of the tax owed, interest, and penalties
that are typically more modest than the taxes owed.277 Canada's RICO
remedy would amount to three times Canada's actual lost tax revenues
and the cost of attorneys' fees, 78 bringing the total far above the
269. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 115.
270. See id. at 130-31 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
271. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
272. Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d at 106.
273. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456,476 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
274. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 433 F.
Supp. 410 (D. Or. 1977), aft'd, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
275. Id. at 1162.
276. See Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 131.
277. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6700(a) (2002) ($1,000 penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters);
§ 6663(a) (seventy-five percent penalty for fraudulent underpayment); Id. at § 6672(a) (2002) (100
percent penalty for willful evasion).
278. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
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damages allowed in a tax collection suit. RICO also allows for equitable
remedies such as divestiture of the defendant's interest, restrictions on
future investments, and dissolution of the enterprise.27 9 The remedial
difference demonstrates that a RICO claim is more than merely an action
for collection of taxes. In fact, Congress allowed treble damages and
attorneys' fees to encourage plaintiffs to bring civil RICO suits in order
to deter and eliminate racketeering activity.2 80 According to the Second
Circuit, there is "an extraordinary disparity" between tax collection
techniques and RICO damages."81
Third, the purpose of Canada's RICO suit is not only to compensate
for injury, but also to deter future racketeering behavior, to divest RICO
enterprises of ill-gotten gains, and to turn plaintiffs into private attorneys
general. 2 Because prosecutors might not identify all RICO violations,
giving those harmed by racketeering an incentive to sue will increase the
total number of RICO claims and further the Congressional goal of
ending organized crime. Holding the defendants accountable would
significantly raise the stakes of smuggling. While some of these
defendants have been subject to criminal RICO liability,283 Congress
created civil RICO liability because it believed that criminal liability was
insufficient to eliminate organized crime.'
RICO's treble damages provisions also punish the defendant for
profiting from racketeering behavior. Treble damages divest the RICO
enterprise of any ancillary benefits received from racketeering beyond
the actual monetary damages that the plaintiff sustained. For example,
the defendants' market share jumped from twelve percent in 1992 to
approximately twenty percent in 1994.285 Tobacco companies have a
special incentive to smuggle their highly addictive products because
consumer use of the smuggled tobacco will likely lead to increased long-
term consumption and bolster brand loyalty even after the smuggling has
ceased. 6 Unlike a tax collection action, a civil RICO action aims to
279. Id. § 1964(a).
280. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,557 (2000).
281. United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1367 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting).
282. Id.; see also supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
283. See United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 2d 415,419 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
284. See United States v. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. 366, 371 (Can.). See also Reynolds I1, 268 F.3d
103, 131 (2d Cir. 2001).
285. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 12.
286. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION 6-9 (1988).
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punish the defendant for these broader gains from illicit behavior,
thereby reducing the incentive to smuggle.
While a tax claim targets those who fail to pay taxes, RICO targets
those who engage in conspiracy and racketeering behaviors. z 7 While a
tax claim is intended only to collect revenue for the state, a RICO claim
benefits a much broader circle of those indirectly injured by
racketeering. 8 Given these distinctions, a RICO claim should not be
characterized as merely an attempt to collect taxes. The Reynolds II
court's essential rnischaracterization of Canada's claim compromised the
court's analysis.
2. Reynolds II Impermissibly Expanded the Scope of the Revenue Rule
by Applying It to Block a RICO Claim
When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, the revenue rule was in
serious doubt. The rule had never been applied to a federal statutory
claim289 and its scope was undefined. 290 Thus, Congress would not have
contemplated the expansion of the revenue rule to interfere with a RICO
claim. Congress did not expressly abrogate the common law rule.
However, it was unnecessary for Congress to address the revenue rule,
given its maligned status and dubious application to a statutory cause of
action. In addition, Congress inserted a liberal construction clause into
RICO, to ensure that future courts would not narrow the statute.
The Reynolds II court expanded the revenue rule by applying it to a
statutory claim. 91 The majority cites only one case in which the rule
barred a U.S. federal statutory action, United States v. Boots. 292 However,
the Second Circuit expressly rejected Boots. 293 In fact, all of the
subsequent cases from the Second Circuit allowed the statutory claims to
proceed notwithstanding the involvement of foreign tax laws. 294 In
287. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
288. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988).
289. Gilbertson, decided in 1979, was the first case to apply the international revenue rule. See
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161,
1164 (9th Cir. 1979).
290. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2001).
291. Id. at 135 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
292. 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).
293. United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547,553 (2d Cir.1997).
294. See Trapilo,130 F.3d at 547; United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000); European
Community. v. RiR Nabisco, 150 F. Supp. 2d 456,483 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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contrast, all of the American cases relied on by the Reynolds II majority
apply the revenue rule in situations where the cause of action is based on
a foreign revenue law or judgment.295 It was not until Boots was decided
in 1996 that the revenue rule was used as a defense to a U.S. statutory
claim, more than 25 years after RICO's promulgation. 96
Despite the confusion surrounding the revenue rule, under Gilbertson,
the revenue rule primarily prohibits a suit by a foreign sovereign for the
enforcement of a tax judgment rendered in another country.297 The
Second Circuit has held that not all cases involving foreign taxes
mandate dismissal under the revenue rule.298 Unlike Gilbertson and most
other revenue rule cases, the source of liability here is an American
statute, not a foreign revenue law. The Reynolds II majority refered to the
Canadian case United States v. Harden2 99 for the proposition that the
revenue rule blocks claims that are only "indirectly" for tax revenues.
However, Harden involved a stipulation of settlement of a foreign tax
claim,"0 which is more analogous to a tax judgment than a RICO claim,
because the liability is derived from violating tax laws, not racketeering.
A RICO claim cannot be equated with a claim to enforce a foreign
revenue law.3"' To apply the revenue rule to block a statutory cause of
action is a novel expansion of the common law rule that did not exist at
all before 1996.302 Even now, it is questionable whether the revenue rule
should ever apply to a cause of action based on a U.S. statute.
The Reynolds II court's novel expansion of the revenue rule was also
impermissible because RICO is a broad remedial statute and expanding
the revenue rule inappropriately narrows the scope of the statute.
Remedial statutes should be liberally construed to effectuate
Congressional purpose and discourage evasions by wrongdoers.3 3 RICO
itself contains a liberal construction clause, which codifies this rule of
statutory construction. It is within the Congressional purpose of RICO to
295. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 109-11 (explaining that the early English cases use the revenue rule
in a different sense). See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
296. Boots, 80 F.3d at 587-88.
297. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d
1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1979).
298. See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1997).
299. [1963] S.C.R. 366, 371 (Can.).
300. [1963] S.C.R. at 371.
301. See supra notes 270-88 and accompanying text.
302. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580,588 (1st Cir. 1996).
303. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1964).
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punish and deter schemes such as the one at issue in Reynolds 11.304 The
Reynolds II court used the revenue rule as an exception to bar an
otherwise valid RICO suit. Although exceptions to remedial statutes
should be narrowly construed, the court instead adopted an expansive
new version of the revenue rule, one at odds with Second Circuit
precedent. Restricting RICO through the revenue rule is contrary to the
Supreme Court's practice of rejecting limitations on the statute's
application and reading RICO broadly." 5
To justify its novel expansion of the revenue rule, the Reynolds II
court asserted that statutes are interpreted to preserve well established
common law. However, although Congress did not expressly abrogate
the common law revenue rule in enacting RICO, it was not necessary for
Congress to do so. The revenue rule's existence was uncertain when
RICO was promulgated, in part because the domestic revenue rule had
been virtually abolished.0 6 In 1970, the revenue rule had never been
applied in the international context.0 7 The few cases that mentioned the
revenue rule failed to define it precisely, 08 so the scope of the rule was
ambiguous. It is not clear that Congress would have believed that the rule
was still being applied when it drafted the RICO statute.
Where the scope of the common law rule is ambiguous, a new
extension of the rule cannot be logically called "well established." Had
the application of the revenue rule to block U.S. statutes been firmly
embedded in the common law at the time that RICO was promulgated,
then there might be a presumption favoring its continued existence.0 9
Because this is a novel use of the revenue rule, and the revenue rule was
never used to deprive a foreign country of a statutory cause of action
prior to the enactment of RICO, the revenue rule cannot be used to
restrict the scope of the statute. In addition, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the common law should not prevail where it would
frustrate the purpose of a remedial statute, or to lessen its scope or
obviate the remedial purpose of the statute for a significant class of
304. See United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1355 (2d Cir. 1989).
305. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985). See also supra notes 43-60
and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
308. See Reynolds 11, 268 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2001).
309. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
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plaintiffs30 ' Rules of statutory interpretation do not require courts to
adhere to the common law if to do so would be at odds with obvious
legislative purpose or lessen the plain scope of the statute. 1 Congress
need not affirmatively proscribe every common law rule that might
frustrate the statute's goals. In sum, the existence of the revenue rule
was in question at the time that RICO was enacted, and its scope remains
ambiguous. 3 Such an indeterminate rule should not be applied to lessen
the scope of RICO.
VI. CONCLUSION
RICO is a broad statute designed to attack organized crime with
formidable civil sanctions. The Second Circuit's attempt to restrict the
scope of RICO with the revenue rule violated canons of statutory
construction, and RICO's liberal construction clause, because it used a
common law doctrine with only weak support to narrow the statute and
frustrate its purpose. In addition, the separation of powers issues in the
case were not significant enough to warrant dismissing the case. This
application of the revenue rule could encourage international tax evasion
and smuggling by depriving foreign governments of a powerful cause of
action for behaviors that take place primarily on American soil. Canada
has petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court, and a similar case will likely
be appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.314 Thus, the issue of international
smuggling in tobacco is far from resolved. Given Congress' purpose in
enacting RICO was to seek the eradication of organized crime and to
divest wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains the denial of a civil cause of
action to foreign governments does not just deny foreign governments of
tax revenues-it deprives RICO of the deterrent effect that Congress
intended to create.
310. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779,783 (1952).
311. Id. at782-83.
312. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
313. Reynolds II, 268 F.3d at 109.
314. Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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